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COURT REPORTS

causing damage to the land and to crops on the land. Bihuniak sought
an injunction against Corrigans ordering Corrigans to refrain from
causing more diffused surface water to drain onto Bihuniak's land.
Bihuniak also sought damages for the cost to repair Bihuniak's land
and for crop losses. The trial court held that Bihuniak did not prove
damages to the land or crops, and that Bihuniak was not entitled to
injunctive relieve because Bihuniak did not show that Corrigans acted
negligently in causing an increase in surface water on Bihuniak's land.
Bihuniak appealed the trial court judgment to the Court of Appeals of
Nebraska.
The court reviewed this equity action de novo on the record. The
court followed four long-standing rules. First, a landowner may protect
his land from surface water, even to the damage of his or her neighbor,
and the landowner is only responsible for negligence. Second, a landowner may deflect surface water by proper use and improvement and is
not liable for consequential damage to his neighbor if he or she was
not negligent. Third, an upper landowner, in the absence of negligence, may accelerate surface water in the natural course of drainage
without liability to the lower landowner. Fourth, a landowner's right to
discharge surface water does not allow him or her to collect and discharge water onto another's land by means of an artificial channel
contrary to the natural course of drainage to the other landowner's
damage and detriment. Here, even though there was an increase in
the amount of surface water flowing across Bihuniak's land, the increased flow followed the same natural drainageway as before Corrigans' improvements to their land. Corrigans built a detention pond to
reduce the flow of surface water; an engineer testified that the pond
was too small but it met the city's requirements and the city approved
the plans. Because the pond met those requirements, Corrigans did
not behave negligently or unreasonably in dispersing water on Bihuniak's land. Thus, the court held that Bihuniak failed to both plead
and prove negligence against Corrigans.
A grant of injunction is an extraordinary remedy that requires
proving actual and substantial injury. Bihuniak presented evidence to
show lost crop value in one year, but not in following years. In addition, Bihuniak did not present evidence of damage to the land. Consequently, the court held that Bihuniak did not show the requisite irreparable harm, so Bihuniak was not entitled to injunctive relief. The
court affirmed the trial court's judgment that Bihuniak was not entitled to an injunction against Corrigans, and that Corrigans did not
behave negligently.
HeatherRutherford
NEVADA
Howell v. Ricci, 197 P.3d 1044 (Nev. 2008) (holding that a letter written by the Nevada State Engineer is a decision subject to judicial re-
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view, that a writ of mandamus is not available to review the State Engineer's decision, and that the State Engineer lacks the authority to resolve questions of title in water rights disputes).
The Supreme Court of Nevada considered whether the Howells,
who claimed title to 116.43 acre-feet of water flowing over their property, had correctly appealed the claim in district court after the Nevada
State Engineer denied their claim in a letter of decision. Just before
the Howells took possession of the property, their immediate predecessors submitted a request for conveyance of the water rights to the State
Engineer. The State Engineer denied the request based on an apparent conflict in the chain of title to the water rights. In 1944, the Pacific
Reclamation Water Company filed applications for permits to change
the point of diversion, manner, and place of the 116.43 acre feet of
water which flowed over the Howells' property. Thus, the State Engineer concluded that, based on these applications, the water rights were
no longer tied to the Howells' property. In 1999, the Howells filed suit
in the District Court of Nevada to challenge the State Engineer's refusal to grant a report of conveyance.
In May of 2002, the court dismissed the Howells' petition based on
Nevada law, which provides that judicial review of a State Engineer's
decision must occur within 30 days of the decision. Because the
Howells based their appeal on a 1944 decision, the court reasoned,
their petition went beyond the 30 days allowed by statute. The Howells
appealed, and Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
order.
After the court of appeals' decision, the Nevada Legislature
amended state law to clarify the procedures for adjudicating and appropriating water rights. First, it added a provision to existing law
which explained that only a court of competent jurisdiction has the
power to determine conflicting claims to ownership of a water right.
Additionally, it added a provision stating that when the State Engineer
receives notification that a court of competent jurisdiction has entered
a judgment confirming ownership of a water right or resolving a conflict in a chain of title, the State Engineer's office must conform to that
judgment. The Howells interpreted these amendments to mean that
the State Engineer's 1944 decision did not change the Howell's title to
the water rights. Thus, in March of 2005, the Howells filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus or judicial review in the district court. In
March 2007, the district court dismissed the Howells' claim and this
appeal followed.
On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court considered which of the
State Engineer's decisions are subject to review, what is the proper
procedural mechanism to review such decisions, and whether the State
Engineer has the authority to adjudicate water rights.
The Court first determined that any order relating to the administration of determined rights by the State Engineer was subject to re-
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view. Thus, the court held that the informal letter sent to the Howells
was reviewable under Nevada law. Next, the court explained that a writ
of mandamus will not issue unless the respondent has no plain, speedy,
and accurate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. In this case,
the Howells could not rely upon mandamus because of the availability
.of the alternative legal remedy ofjudicial review. Thus, the court held
that judicial review is the proper procedural mechanism for reviewing
a State Engineer's decision. Furthermore, the court held that only a
court of competent jurisdiction has the power to determine conflicting
claims to ownership to a water right. Finally, the court held that because the State Engineer never had the power to resolve title questions,
and the 2005 legislative amendments merely reaffirmed this, the
amendments could not provide the basis for an appeal. However, the
court noted that its decision did not preclude the Howells from contesting title ownership to the water rights in a quiet title action in district court.
As a result, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the
Howells' petition for judicial review.
Allison Graboski
NEW JERSEY
Bubis v. Kassin, 960 A.2d 779 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (holding
that the Public Trust Doctrine does not: (1) protect private views of the
ocean from obstruction by the public's use of the beach below the high
water mark, or (2) guarantee public access to a private oceanfront
property devoted to uses other than public use.
Jack and Joyce Kassin (the "Kassins") own approximately 650 feet
of oceanfront property in the Village of Loch Arbour and use it strictly
for their own private enjoyment. The remaining 350 feet of oceanfront property in Loch Arbour is a public beach that a municipality
owns and operates. On June 27, 2004, Sophie Bubis ("Mrs. Bubis") accessed the Kassins' beachfront property through a public access path
and placed her beach chair below the mean high water mark (the
"foreshore") directly in front of one of the Kassins' beach huts. Mrs.
Bubis refused to relocate when a lifeguard, employed by the Kassins,
asked Mrs. Bubis to move due to the obstruction of the Kassins' view.
Mrs. Bubis left only after the police served her with a complaint and
summons for defiant trespass.
Mrs. Bubis subsequently filed a motion for enforcement of litigant's rights in the Chancery Division of the Municipal Court alleging
the Kassins interfered with her rights under the Public Trust Doctrine
as well as her rights to use a portion of the Kassins' property above the
foreshore. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded the
Kassins could limit the public's use of the foreshore. The trial court
allowed recreational activities such as surfing and fishing and reasonable rest periods within the foreshore; however, the trial court explic-

